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DEALING WITH DISRUPTION:
EMERGING APPROACHES TO FINTECH REGULATION
Saule T. Omarova*
INTRODUCTION
“Fintech” is a loosely defined term for “technology-enabled innovation
in financial services that could result in new business models, applications,
processes or products with an associated material effect on the provision of
financial services.”1 As a practical matter, it denotes a rapidly evolving
universe of various digital assets, technologies, and infrastructures that are
collectively transforming the operation of today’s financial markets.
Technology is changing the way people make payments, manage
investments, borrow funds, and enter into contracts.2 Technology
companies, big and small, are entering the market for financial services,
changing the structural configuration and dynamics in those markets.3
Incumbent financial institutions are hiring cryptographers and computer

*
Saule T. Omarova is Beth and Marc Goldberg Professor of Law at Cornell University.
1.
See FIN. STABILITY BD., FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS FROM FINTECH 7 (2017),
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/R270617.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2VJB-Z53E].
While
acknowledging the imprecise nature of this broad term, this article does not seek to enter the definitional
debate. For a more detailed overview of fintech, see Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech
as a Systemic Phenomenon, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 735, 743-746 (2019) [hereinafter New Tech v. New
Deal].
2.
See Trevor Dryer, Five Trends Shaping Fintech into 2020, FORBES (Sept. 9, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesfinancecouncil/2019/09/09/five-trends-shaping-fintech-into2020/#22de06002f13 [https://perma.cc/L8JY-D9LE].
3.
See Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Lent $1 Billion to Merchants to Boost Sales on its Marketplace,
REUTERS (June 8, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-loans-idUSKBN18Z0DY
[https://perma.cc/86SC-B8LC]; Michael del Castillo, Facebook Reveals Cryptocurrency Plans for Two
New
Revenue
Streams,
FORBES
(June
18,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeldelcastillo/2019/06/18/facebook-cryptocurrency-everythingevery-business-leader-needs-to-know/#608d537d7a31 [https://perma.cc/5WDF-RG46]; Press Release,
Apple, Introducing Apple Card, A New Kind of Credit Card Created by Apple (Mar. 25, 2019),
https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2019/03/introducing-apple-card-a-new-kind-of-credit-card-createdby-apple/ [https://perma.cc/75L5-7E73].
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scientists in an effort to stay competitive and to retain, or regain, their
market advantage.4
It is not surprising, therefore, that the rise of fintech in the last decade
poses a wide range of legal and regulatory challenges. Financial regulators
around the globe are grappling with complex questions of law and policy
presented by fintech applications.5 Some of the most immediately pressing
issues, for example, concern the economic functions and corresponding
regulatory status of specific tech-driven financial instruments.6 These
definitional questions are key to expanding specific regulators’ jurisdiction
to include these new and unfamiliar products and services. Furthermore,
there is often a great deal of uncertainty around the reliability and
governance of the new types of market infrastructure that these new
products and services demand. Issues of consumer and investor protection,
financial crime prevention, and enforcement of anti-money-laundering rules
also acquire renewed significance in this new context.7

4.
See Anna Irrera, JPMorgan Chase Revamps Entry-Level Tech Program in Race for Talent,
REUTERS (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-jpmorgan-tech/jpmorgan-chase-revampsentry-level-tech-program-in-race-for-talent-idUSKBN1KU2JR [https://perma.cc/T247-BZ3E].
5.
See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY BD., FINTECH CREDIT: MARKET STRUCTURE, BUSINESS MODELS
FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS (May 22, 2017), http://www.fsb.org/wpAND
content/uploads/CGFS-FSB-Report-on-FinTech-Credit.pdf [https://perma.cc/CLT9-C9TK]; U.K.
CRYPTOASSETS
TASKFORCE,
FINAL
REPORT
(2018),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7520
70/cryptoassets_taskforce_final_report_final_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/PR5S-293Y]; WORLD ECON.
FORUM, REALIZING THE POTENTIAL OF BLOCKCHAIN: A MULTISTAKEHOLDER APPROACH TO THE
STEWARDSHIP
OF
BLOCKCHAIN
AND
CRYPTOCURRENCIES
(2017),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Realizing_Potential_Blockchain.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P2LHBPTX]; John Schindler, FinTech and Financial Innovation: Drivers and Depth (Fed. Reserve Fin. &
Econ.
Discussion
Series
Paper
No.
2017-081,
2017),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2017081pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/3A9Y-QH7N].
6.
See, e.g., CLIFFORD CHANCE, THE TREATMENT OF CRYPTOTOKENS AT ENGLISH LAW:
BACK
TO
THE
FUTURE
(July
2019),
https://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2019/07/the-treatment-ofcryptotokens-at-english-law-back-to-the-future.pdf [https://perma.cc/DF43-JRS3]; Jacquelyn Jaeger,
SEC Seeks to Thwart Cryptocurrency Masquerading as ICO, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Oct. 17, 2019),
https://www.complianceweek.com/regulatory-enforcement/sec-seeks-to-thwart-cryptocurrencymasquerading-as-ico/27896.article [https://perma.cc/2S7F-XUSK]; Paul Vigna & Dave Michaels, Are
ICO Tokens Securities? Startup Wants a Judge to Decide, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 27, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/are-ico-tokens-securities-startup-wants-a-judge-to-decide-11548604800.
7.
See supra notes 5-6; FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES: KEY DEFINITIONS
POTENTIAL
AML/CFT
RISKS
(2014),
https://www.fatfAND
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and-potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SUA4-4NWE].
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In the background of the legal and regulatory debates on these and other
regulatory scheme-specific questions, the more fundamental questions of
systemic risk and financial stability, monetary policy, and structural shifts
in the broader economy are beginning to occupy a more prominent place on
legislators’ and regulators’ fintech agenda. Answering these “big”
questions, however, requires a different—more deliberately systemic and
macro-level—thinking about fintech and its implications for public policy.8
Given the enormity of that task, the search for these answers is inevitably a
complex and gradual process, which is bound to take a variety of forms in
different jurisdictions.
At this early stage in the process, it is difficult to provide a detailed
analysis of all fintech-related regulatory developments around the globe. It
is nevertheless helpful to identify some of the key features that most such
developments appear to have in common. It is with this goal in mind that
this symposium article examines the emerging regulatory responses to
fintech disruption. Focusing primarily on the U.S. experience to date, the
article offers a rough three-part taxonomy of principal approaches to fintech
taken by financial regulators: what I call the “experimentation” approach,
the “incorporation” approach, and the “accommodation” approach.
It is important to note that the purpose of this exercise is not to enumerate
in exhaustive detail all regulatory activities that target or affect fintech, but
to develop a conceptual framework for making sense of such measures as
constitutive elements of an evolving philosophy of fintech regulation.9 In
the academic literature and industry debate, this gradually emerging
regulatory philosophy is frequently discussed under a loose label of “smart”
regulation: iterative, flexible, carefully tailored, risk-sensitive, and
innovation-friendly.10 Today, this notion of “smart” regulation remains
more of an aspiration than an actual regulatory model. At the same time, the

8.
For an in-depth discussion of the factors necessitating, and basic principles underlying, such
a deliberately macro-systemic regulatory paradigm, see Saule T. Omarova, Technology v. Technocracy:
Fintech as a Regulatory Challenge (Sept. 30, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Washington University Journal of Law and Policy).
9.
For example, the article does not discuss regulatory agencies’ decisions with respect to legal
categorizations of specific technologies or fintech products as “securities,” “commodities,” etc. Nor does
it examine the ongoing legislative and regulatory efforts to revise existing rules governing specific types
of commercial transactions or regulated financial services, in order to accommodate the growth of
fintech markets. While undeniably important, these measures generally operate on a more granular level.
10.
See infra Part I.
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normative ideal behind this metaphor is gradually seeping into, and
molding, the regulatory adaptation to the massive digitization of finance.11
Analyzing the currently emerging methods of such regulatory adaptation,
therefore, lays the necessary foundation for an important public policy
discussion on whether it is the right ideal.
The article proceeds as follows. Part I provides the necessary context and
conceptual framing for the discussion by elucidating the systemic
significance of, and the need for a concerted regulatory response to, the
ongoing fintech disruption. Parts II through IV identify and examine three
broadly drawn categories of the emerging regulatory approaches to fintech.
Part II begins by analyzing the increasingly popular practice of
experimenting with so-called “regulatory sandboxes.” Part III focuses on
the current efforts to incorporate new tech-driven financial service providers
into the existing regulatory regime by issuing special fintech charters or
licenses. Part IV discusses the diffuse strategy of regulatory accommodation
of new technologies, including the rise of so-called “regulatory
technology,” or RegTech. Finally, the conclusion outlines some of the broad
themes emerging out of this taxonomic exercise.
I. FINTECH AS A REGULATORY DISRUPTION: OVERVIEW
In the popular and expert discourses alike, fintech developments are
routinely praised for their potential to (1) increase the efficiency of financial
transactions; and (2) expand access to financial services.12 The key benefit
of applying new digital technologies to finance is that it promises to
eliminate transactional frictions that increase the costs of transacting in
today’s financial markets. Making financial transactions faster, easier, and
cheaper, in turn, unlocks new opportunities for financial inclusion and

11.
See infra Parts II-IV.
12.
See, e.g., Jeff Horowitz & Eric Scro, Creating an Open Financial System and Why
Institutionalization is Key, in KPMG, INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CRYPTOASSETS 11 (2018),
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/us/pdf/2018/11/institutionalization-cryptoassets.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YPT6-PBEA] (arguing that crypto may help overcome some of the most fundamental
problems of the global financial system); Financial Technology – Fintech, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fintech.asp [https://perma.cc/9DPN-RJU8] (stating that fintech
firms are designed to challenge traditional financial institutions by “being more nimble, serving an
underserved segment or providing faster and/or better service.”).
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expanded access to financial services.13 In this sense, fintech seems poised
to disrupt financial markets’ operations not only as a matter of transactional
efficiency but also as a matter of “democratization” of finance.14
Private cryptocurrencies provide one of the most visible examples of such
disruption.15 The first cryptocurrency to go mainstream was Bitcoin, an
online communication protocol that enables the use of bitcoins—electronic
tokens or bits of data—as a means of payment and exchange similar to
regular currencies.16 Importantly, innovative blockchain technology—or,
more broadly, distributed ledger technology (DLT)—underlying Bitcoin’s
and multiple other cryptocurrencies’ operation offers potentially significant
transactional benefits in optimizing payments, as well as clearing and
settlement of trades in a much wider range of traditional financial
instruments. Digital crowdfunding17 and robo-advising18 provide another
set of examples of using new technologies, including artificial intelligence
(AI) and “big data” analytics, to broaden access to financial services beyond
the narrow band of the wealthy and the privileged.

13.
14.
15.

See Horowitz & Scro, supra note 12.
See New Tech v. New Deal, supra note 1 at 745.
For a comprehensive analysis of cryptocurrencies and legal issues they raise, see ROSA
MARIA LASTRA & JASON GRANT ALLEN, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES IN THE EUROSYSTEM: CHALLENGES
AHEAD,
ECON
Monetary
Dialogue
Study
23-24
(2018),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/150541/DIW_FINAL%20publication.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M97J-W7SG].
16.
For more on Bitcoin generally, see PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN
AND THE LAW (2018); NATHANIEL POPPER, DIGITAL GOLD: BITCOIN AND THE INSIDE STORY OF THE
MISFITS AND MILLIONAIRES TRYING TO REINVENT MONEY (2015); PAUL VIGNA & MICHAEL J. CASEY,
THE AGE OF CRYPTOCURRENCY: HOW BITCOIN AND DIGITAL MONEY ARE CHALLENGING THE GLOBAL
ECONOMIC ORDER (2015); KEVIN WERBACH, THE BLOCKCHAIN AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF
TRUST (2018).
17.
The two key examples of digital crowdfunding are “initial coin offerings” (ICOs) and
marketplace lending (MPL). The term “ICO” refers generally to transactions in which firms raise capital
online by issuing digital tokens, or “coins,” that carry various rights with respect to some future digital
product or service the issuing firms intend to finance and develop. See New Tech v. New Deal, supra
note 1, at 784-786. The term “MPL” is defined broadly as “any practice of pairing borrowers and lenders
through the use of an online platform without a traditional bank intermediary.” Marketplace Lending, in
12 Supervisory Insights, FDIC Supervisory Insights 12 (Winter 2015), FDIC SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS
(Winter
2015),
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/siwin15/si_winter2015article02.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7MN-RKXA].
18.
“Robo-advising” refers to the increasingly popular practice of providing automated
investment advice and asset management services using algorithms and asset-allocation models tailored
to individual investors’ needs and preferences. See New Tech v. New Deal, supra note 1, at 787-789.
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It is, of course, easy to stipulate both the efficiency-enhancing and accessexpanding benefits of fintech, at least in theory. As I have argued
elsewhere, however, this perspective reflects a fundamentally microtransactional view of fintech and its systemic implications.19 In the current
discourse, the pros and cons of specific technological advances are
examined predominantly, if not entirely, through the lens of their potential
impact on the transacting counterparties’ costs, convenience, or market
access.20 This perspective inevitably obscures the deeper systemic
significance of fintech as a potential disruption of the fundamental political
arrangement underlying the operation of the modern financial system.21
This arrangement—which I have previously dubbed the “New Deal
settlement in finance”—institutionalizes certain politically derived
judgments about the optimal balance of private freedom and public control
in the financial market.22 Under its terms, private market actors retain
control over substantive decisions on how to allocate financial capital to
various productive uses. This is so because of their (putatively) superior
ability to gather and process vital market information at the micro-level.23
The public, on the other hand, bears the primary responsibility for
modulating credit-money aggregates and maintaining the overall stability of
the financial system. This modulating role enables markets to function
smoothly and efficiently.24 From this perspective, financial regulation
emerges as the key mechanism through which the public manages the moral
hazard built into the New Deal settlement in finance. In essence, regulation
constrains private market participants’ ability to generate excessive systemwide risks in pursuit of private profits.25
Today’s most popular and visible fintech applications—including cloud
computing, AI, big data analytics, blockchain and crypto-tokens, and smart

19.
Id. at 739-40.
20.
Id.
21.
Id. at 740.
22.
Id. at 746-47.
23.
For an in-depth discussion of this fundamental public-private division of powers in modern
finance, see Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV.
1143, 1149 (2017); New Tech v. New Deal, supra note 1, at 740.
24.
See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 23, at 1149.
25.
See id. (arguing that government regulation is the mechanism for preventing the overgeneration of credit-money by private financial institutions to which the sovereign delegated the
allocative, and thus credit-generative, functions).
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contracts—tend to amplify the ability of private market actors to generate
and trade financial risks.26 By making transactions in financial markets
nearly instantaneous and frictionless, new technologies enable private
market participants to engage in the continuous synthesizing of digital assets
tradable in potentially infinitely scalable virtual markets. Accordingly, what
is commonly extolled as fintech’s principal micro-level benefit—its ability
to eliminate transactional frictions and to create a virtually seamless
marketplace—also magnifies the system’s overall capacity to fuel financial
speculation on an unprecedented scale.27 Thus, the principal source of
macro-level risk posed by fintech is its (still poorly understood) power to
exacerbate the financial system’s dysfunctional boom-and-bust dynamics.28
Importantly, however, these technological advances do not
simultaneously—or proportionately—amplify the sovereign public’s ability
to control the explosive growth of private liabilities and risk-creation in the
system. As a result, the faster, bigger, algorithm-driven, and tech-dominated
financial market poses a fundamental regulatory challenge. Financial
regulators are increasingly facing complex technical and distributional
issues in a rapidly evolving context. And, all too often, they have no legal
or regulatory tools for dealing with these issues in a comprehensive manner.
In this sense, the fintech disruption invites a potentially decisive shift in
the inherently unstable public-private balance in modern finance. On the
one hand, the fintech era presents a unique set of opportunities to correct the
destabilizing structural asymmetry between private actors’ freedom to
generate financial risks and the sovereign public’s ability to accommodate
them. On the other hand, new technologies may also be used in ways that
further magnify this asymmetry and thus exacerbate the financial system’s
present dysfunctions.29
In this context, it is critically important to develop a comprehensive,
effective, and normatively unified regulatory strategy for managing
technology-driven changes in financial markets. Recognizing this
imperative, numerous regulatory agencies around the world are studying

26.
For a detailed discussion, see New Tech v. New Deal, supra note 1.
27.
Id. at 742.
28.
Id. at 755.
29.
See id. at 742. For a theoretical account of the financial system’s structural dysfunctions, see
Hockett & Omarova, supra note 24.
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fintech developments, soliciting public comments, and issuing informal
guidance on various issues raised by specific financial technologies.30 In
many countries, a wide range of special taskforces and interagency groups
are formed for these very purposes.31 Regulators are cooperating with
practicing lawyers and academic experts in an effort to figure out whether,
and how, to adapt various specific regulatory requirements to the new
market realities. Lawmakers are conducting hearings and commissioning
reports in contemplation of future legislative action.32
Yet, financial regulators are generally reluctant to take assertive action
with respect to fintech, for fear of prematurely “stifling” financial
innovation.33 As the industry continues to develop and commercialize new
tech products, financial regulators remain predominantly in the role of
outside observers.34 The novelty and technical complexity of these

30.
See, e.g., Cong. Res. Serv., Financial Innovation: Reducing Fintech Regulatory Uncertainty,
(Apr. 25, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF11195.pdf [https://perma.cc/29M9-RXW9] (describing
recent U.S. policy initiatives aiming at reducing regulatory uncertainty with respect to fintech); Lee
Reiners, How Regulators Are Responding to Fintech, THE FINREG BLOG (June 29, 2018),
https://sites.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2018/06/29/how-regulators-are-responding-to-fintech/
[https://perma.cc/F2D6-AG7U].
31.
See Press Release, U.S. House Comm. on Fin. Servs., Press Release: Waters Announces
Committee Taskforces on Fintech and Artificial Intelligence (May 9, 2019),
https://financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=403738
[https://perma.cc/K5TV-8LSD]; Task Force on Financial Technology, EUR. COMM’N (Mar. 28, 2017),
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/fisma/item-detail.cfm?item_id=56443 [https://perma.cc/XN7Y-DEEA];
Anastas Chobanov, ECB Creates Innovation Hub to Focus on Fintech Research, CHAINBULLETIN.COM
(Nov. 12, 2019), https://chainbulletin.com/ecb-creates-innovation-hub-to-focus-on-fintech-research/
[https://perma.cc/QK8B-SC25].
32.
See Examining the Fintech Landscape: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. (Sept. 12, 2017); Barbara S. Mishkin, House and Senate to Hold
Hearings on Fintech, Artificial Intelligence, BALLARD SPAHR CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (June 24,
2019),
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2019/06/24/house-and-senate-to-hold-hearingsfocused-on-fintech-artificial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/JZ7X-5JM6].
33.
This does not refer to enforcement actions against specific fintech companies found to have
violated specific laws and regulations, or the few instances of governments banning specific
cryptocurrencies or token offerings. See Darryn Pollock, From Gibraltar to Australia: How Countries
Approach ICOs, COINTELEGRAPH (Feb. 16, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/from-gibraltar-toaustralia-how-countries-approach-icos [https://perma.cc/H8QY-TBUT].
34.
See, e.g., Meyer Aaron, Francisco Rivadeneyra and Samantha Sohal, Fintech: Is This Time
Different? A Framework for Assessing Risks and Opportunities for Central Banks 3 (Bank of Canada
Staff
Discussion
Paper
2017-10,
July
2017),
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2017/07/sdp2017-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/THR4-3MGC] (stating that “at the moment
the best response of central banks is to monitor fintech to form a view on its risks and opportunities, by
providing access to the infrastructures central banks control”).
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developments make this cautious approach appear sensible. In large part,
however, this reactive posture reflects the fundamental limitations of the
presently dominant technocratic model of financial regulation. This model
not only systematically prioritizes technical expertise over normative
commitment, but it also prioritizes a micro-transactional perspective over a
macro-structural outlook. The principal methods of technocratic regulation
involve identifying and isolating discrete micro-level phenomena and
decision points, and targeting specific market inefficiencies with the help of
minimally invasive technical tools.
These built-in biases are clearly manifested in the structural
compartmentalization of financial regulation. Thus, the current system is
built on regulating individual financial firms, licensed and supervised under
clearly identified regimes, based on the types of products they offer and
activities they engage in.35 The regulatory boundaries among financial
institutions (banks, securities broker-dealers, insurers, etc.) and financial
products (securities, banking products, insurance, commodity futures, etc.)
are drawn in clear categorical terms.36 Within each regulatory silo, the
relevant agency operates under a specific legislative mandate and pursues a
specific set of policy priorities, which reflect the core risks posed by the
specific regulated activities and entities.37
Fintech developments defy the key assumptions underlying this
technocratic philosophy of financial regulation. In the tech-driven financial
market, it is often impossible to draw clear categorical lines between
different products and services. In fact, many recent innovations in finance
are designed specifically to overcome traditional regulatory boundaries,

35.
See Saule T. Omarova, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The Institutional Structure of
U.S. Financial Services Regulation After the Crisis of 2008, in INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF
FINANCIAL REGULATION: THEORIES AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES 137 (Robin Hui Huang & Dirk
Schoenmaker eds., 2014); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-61, FINANCIAL
REGULATION: INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY STRUCTURE
(2004); GROUP OF THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: APPROACHES AND
CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE (2008).
36.
For a detailed discussion, see Omarova, supra note 8, at 9.
37.
See id. This type of administrative fragmentation is very specific to the United States. That,
however, should not obscure the bigger point about structural compartmentalization as the key element
of the technocratic regulatory philosophy, more generally. Thus, even in jurisdictions with less
fragmented bureaucratic systems, different financial products and markets (securities, banking,
insurance, and so on) are typically supervised and regulated under substantively and operationally
different regimes. Id.
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which make financial transactions slower and more expensive.38 Given the
fluidity and functional flexibility of technological solutions, it is extremely
difficult to identify, measure, and target precisely the specific facets of
fintech products’ operation and design, especially via familiar regulatory
tools and methods.39
By putting increasing pressure on the existing regime of financial
regulation and supervision, the rise of fintech exposed the need for revisiting
the broader regulatory philosophy underlying and guiding that regime.
Today, however, there is little clarity on what that new, fintech-ready
regulatory philosophy should look like. To the extent there is a discussion
of the high-level principles suitable for regulating the risks posed by fintech,
it generally seems to evolve around the familiar metaphor of “smart”
regulation.
The idea of “smart” regulation predates not only the fintech era, but also
the global financial crisis of 2008.40 It is a variation on the broader concept
of “New Governance,” which became very popular in academic and policy
discussions in the pre-crisis period.41 In the context of the current debate on
fintech, “smart” regulation is generally described as a sequenced set of
“proportionate” regulatory responses to identified fintech-driven risks,
which explicitly aim to facilitate and support financial innovation.42
Today’s proponents of “smart” regulation typically emphasize—explicitly
or, more often, implicitly—the technically precise, data-driven, marketfriendly, and pragmatic nature of this philosophy.43 Among other things, a
“smart” approach to fintech regulation requires a much more aggressive

38.

See FIN. STABILITY BD., CRYPTO-ASSETS: WORK UNDERWAY, REGULATORY APPROACHES
POTENTIAL GAPS 8-9 (2019), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P310519.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q3NZ-5KEA].
39.
Id. at 19, 38.
40.
See, e.g., NEIL GUNNINGHAM & PETER GRABOSKY, SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1998) (advancing and advocating the concept of “smart” regulation).
41.
For an intellectual history of the New Governance movement, see CRISTIE FORD,
INNOVATION AND THE STATE: FINANCE, REGULATION, AND JUSTICE 91-96 (2017).
42.
See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Optimizing Regulation for an Optimizing Economy, 4 U. PA. J.L.
& PUB. AFF. 1 (2018); Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, Janos N. Barberis & Douglas W. Arner,
Regulating Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart Regulation, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 31 (2017);
43.
See Zetzsche et al., supra note 42, at 50-53; Mark D. Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M.
Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow: What Happens When Technology Is Faster than the Law? 6 AM. U.
BUS. L. REV. 561 (2017).
AND
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tailoring of regulatory requirements to the unique features of each specific
fintech product or activity.44 The regulators are, therefore, expected to
pursue continuous micro-optimization and customization of legal rules to
fit individual fintech products or activities on their own terms.45 In short,
being “smart” is generally taken to mean “regulating just enough and in the
right ways.”46
While providing few details on how one figures out which measures are
“proportionate” and “right” in any particular context, this framing of what
constitutes a “smart” regulatory strategy in the fintech era is inherently
transaction-oriented and guided by specific technologies. This makes it an
easy sell from the perspective of regulatory continuity. In fact, the general
philosophy of “keeping up with” fintech by adjusting to its pace on a
technology-by-technology basis already appears to shape the overall
trajectory and tone of most regulatory responses to fintech.
On an institutional level, this underlying attitude translates into an explicit
regulatory prioritization of the efforts to cooperate with, learn from, and
assist financial institutions and fintech firms—among other things, by
providing them with greater regulatory certainty and “sensible paths to
compliance.”47 To this end, financial regulators strive to facilitate direct
engagement with the industry in a much closer and institutionally salient
manner. Thus, in 2015, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC)—the federal chartering and regulatory authority for national
banks—launched an agency-wide Responsible Innovation Initiative,
focused on fintech developments.48 The newly established OCC Office of
Innovation now serves as the hub for the agency’s fintech-related

44.
Emphasizing the narrowly tailored, transactional data-driven nature of this regulatory
approach to fintech, some observers describe it as a form of “responsive” regulation. See Fenwick et al.,
supra note 43.
45.
Coglianese, supra note 42, at 2 (“An ever optimizing economy depends on an equally ever
optimizing regulation.”).
46.
Id. at 13.
47.
See Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings,
and Democratization of Capital Markets, 70 HASTINGS L. J. 463, 511-16 (2019).
48.
See Responsible Innovation, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
https://www.occ.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/index-innovation.html
[https://perma.cc/PLN5E94Z]; OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC INNOVATION PILOT PROGRAM 1 (2019),
https://www.occ.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/responsible-innovation/occ-innovation-pilotprogram.pdf [https://perma.cc/HGV3-TSBW].
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activities.49 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), in turn,
created its Office of Innovation in July 2018, in order to promote
“consumer-beneficial innovation.”50 The Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) set up LabCFTC, a fintech-focused hub designed to
make CFTC “more accessible to FinTech innovators,” to promote
“responsible innovation,” and to facilitate the agency’s informationgathering and fintech-related education.51 Individual states and even cities
around the country are establishing their own fintech innovation hubs.52
Outside of the United States, numerous national and international bodies are
also actively pursuing the innovation hub strategy.53
In terms of substantive policies, several potential choices are currently
moving to the center of the financial regulators’ fintech agenda. These
include, most prominently, regulatory experimentation with sandboxes and
special chartering regimes aimed at giving fintech firms a controlled path
toward full legitimation.54 Additionally, RegTech strategies appear to be
gaining greater visibility as a way for financial regulators to respond to the
ongoing changes in the marketplace.55 Finally, the emerging menu of
regulatory responses to fintech includes a variety of seemingly more
mundane, but potentially far-reaching, technical options for absorbing and
providing public infrastructural support for fintech products.56
Accordingly, a fuller understanding of the emerging model of fintech
regulation requires a more detailed examination of each of these three

49.
See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OFFICE OF INNOVATION: A GENERAL
GUIDE, https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/occ-innovation-general-brochure.PDF
[https://perma.cc/4ZNW-FVCY].
50.
See Innovation, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/innovation/ [https://perma.cc/8G3T-A8KC].
51.
LabCFTC
Overview,
U.S.
COMMODITY
FUTURES
TRADING
COMM’N,
https://www.cftc.gov/LabCFTC/Overview/index.htm [https://perma.cc/9ZAT-RJRL].
52.
See Grace Noto, Top 5 Emerging Fintech Hubs in The U.S., BANK INNOVATION (Apr. 17,
2017), https://bankinnovation.net/allposts/biz-lines/payments/top-5-emerging-fintech-hubs-in-the-u-s/
[https://perma.cc/8575-QEV2].
53.
See BIS to Set Up Innovation Hub for Central Banks (June 30, 2019), BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS, https://www.bis.org/press/p190630a.htm [https://perma.cc/QXJ4-M2D3]; EUR. SEC. &
MKTS. AUTH., FinTech: Regulatory Sandboxes and Innovation Hubs (2018); Fintech Knowledge Hub,
EUROPEAN BANKING AUTHORITY, https://eba.europa.eu/financial-innovation-and-fintech/fintechknowledge-hub [https://perma.cc/28ZZ-84SQ].
54.
See infra Parts II, III.
55.
See infra Part IV.
56.
See id.
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regulatory strategies: experimentation, incorporation, and accommodation
of technological changes.
II. THE “EXPERIMENTATION” APPROACH:
REGULATORY SANDBOXES
The term “regulatory sandbox” refers to programs set up by regulatory
agencies for the explicit purpose of enabling private firms to test innovative
financial products and services in a controlled environment.57 There is a
great variation in the specific design and implementation of regulatory
sandboxes around the world. In general, sandboxes provide a “safe space”
for fintech firms and financial firms to offer real products to real customers
with the benefit of a waiver, or a significant relaxation, of otherwise
applicable regulations.58 The principal reasons for establishing regulatory
sandboxes include their potential to support consumer-benefitting financial
innovation, facilitate financial inclusion, improve the efficiency and
competitiveness of domestic financial institutions, and enhance regulators’
understanding of the emerging innovative technologies.59 In this sense,
fintech sandboxes represent a clear case of the experimental learning
strategy on the part of the regulators.
UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) pioneered this approach in
June 2016, when it set up the first fintech regulatory sandbox.60 Any firm,
financial or non-financial, can apply to participate in the FCA sandbox.
Within the FCA sandbox, individual participants receive various forms of
regulatory relief.61 Such relief might include partial authorizations to
conduct specific activities, or individual consultations on legal and
regulatory issues arising in connection with the participating firms’ business

57.
See FInsight: Regulatory Sandboxes, BAKER MCKENZIE: FIN. INSTS. HUB (Oct. 31, 2018),
http://financialinstitutions.bakermckenzie.com/2018/10/31/finsight-regulatory-sandboxes/
[https://perma.cc/6X4U-ER7G].
58.
Hilary J. Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 579, 592, 596 (2019).
59.
See Hilary J. Allen, Sandbox Boundaries, VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. (forthcoming 2019)
(manuscript at 4) (on file with author).
60.
Regulatory Sandbox, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/regulatorysandbox [https://perma.cc/MHB6-BXBD].
61.
Id.
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models.62 In 2019, well over one hundred firms have been accepted to test
their products within the FCA sandbox.63
Australia, Switzerland, Singapore, Thailand, and several other countries
quickly followed the FCA’s sandbox model.64 As the trend spread, the FCA
took on a leadership role in setting up an international group of financial
regulators to pursue a cross-border sandbox strategy.65 In January 2019, the
group officially launched a “global sandbox,” the Global Financial
Innovation Network (GFiN), intended to provide a platform for cross-border
testing of fintech products.66 As of mid-2019, GFiN accepted eight pilot
projects into its program.67
Curiously, the United States has been slow to adopt the regulatory
sandbox idea. This prompted the U.S. Treasury Department to call for
speedy action in this direction as a matter of boosting the country’s global
competitiveness.68 One of the immediate obstacles to adopting the sandbox
strategy in the United States is its highly fragmented structure of financial
oversight, with numerous federal and state regulators exercising exclusive
or overlapping jurisdictional control in their respective siloes.69
Recognizing this problem, the Treasury specifically emphasized that it is
critical “not to allow fragmentation in the financial regulatory system, at
both the federal and state level, to interfere with innovation.”70

62.
Id.; Allen, supra note 58 at 596-597.
63.
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., REGULATORY SANDBOX LESSONS LEARNED REPORT (2017),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research-and-data/regulatory-sandbox-lessons-learned-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V7MX-3LVY].
64.
See Allen, supra note 58, at 592; Zetzsche et al., supra note 42, at 64-66; see also
International Guide to Regulatory Fintech Sandboxes, BAKER MCKENZIE (2018),
https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en//media/files/insight/publications/2018/12/guide_intlguideregulatorysandboxes_dec2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3MGK-3P6V].
65.
Global
Financial
Innovation
Network
(GFIN),
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH.,
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/global-financial-innovation-network. [https://perma.cc/5AMU-GW6C]
66.
Id.
67.
GFIN Cross-Border Testing Pilot – Next Steps, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH.,
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/gfin-cross-border-testing-pilot-next-steps [https://perma.cc/FFC6-KSPJ].
68.
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITIES:
NONBANK
FINANCIALS,
FINTECH,
AND
INNOVATION
9
(2018),
https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-07/A-Financial-System-that-Creates-EconomicOpportunities---Nonbank-Financi....pdf [https://perma.cc/66LZ-K6QS].
69.
Id. at 13-14; see also sources cited supra note 35.
70.
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 68 at 13.
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In December 2018, the CFPB—a federal agency created in the wake of
the 2008 financial crisis and charged with providing integrated oversight of
consumer protection across the financial sector—became the first federal
agency to propose a fintech sandbox.71 The CFPB’s proposal envisioned
granting the participants in the sandbox two years of immunity from
enforcement by any state or federal authorities, as well as private lawsuits,
for violations of consumer protection laws.72 The industry rallied behind
this idea, while a broad coalition of consumer advocates and state authorities
heavily criticized CFPB’s regulatory sandbox proposal for overstepping the
federal agency’s jurisdiction.73
The OCC, on the other hand, took a different experimentation path. After
years of seriously considering the regulatory sandbox idea, the agency
abandoned it in favor of a somewhat less permissive approach: the
Innovation Pilot Program, announced in April 2019.74 The proposed
program seeks “to provide a consistent and transparent framework for
eligible entities to engage with the OCC on pilots, which are small-scale,
short-term tests to determine feasibility or consider how a large-scale
activity might work in practice.”75 The focus of the Innovation Pilot
Program is on “new or unique activities where uncertainty is perceived to
be a barrier to development and implementation” and is open only to OCCsupervised entities.76 To be eligible for participation, applicants are required
to demonstrate that the proposed product has the potential to achieve at least
one of the publicly beneficial goals that include meeting “the evolving needs

71.
Policy on No-Action Letters and the BCFP Product Sandbox, 83 Fed. Reg. 64,036 (proposed
Dec. 13, 2018).
72.
Id. at 64,037; Kate Berry, Mulvaney’s Last Move at CFPB Aims to Help Fintechs, AM.
BANKER (Dec. 11, 2018, 2:03 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/mick-mulvaneys-lastmove-at-cfpb-aims-to-help-fintechs [https://perma.cc/2RJF-LAGW].
73.
See Kate Berry, State AGs Assail CFPB Plan to Build Fintech Sandbox, AM. BANKER (Feb.
12, 2019, 4:14 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/state-ags-assail-cfpb-plan-to-buildfintech-sandbox [https://perma.cc/VFK8-LM48]; Steven Harras, States, Consumer Groups Blast
CALL
(Feb.
21,
2019,
5:02
AM),
CFPB’s
Fintech
Protections,
ROLL
https://www.rollcall.com/news/congress/states-consumer-groups-blast-cfpbs-fintech-protections
[https://perma.cc/88Z7-SBQV].
74.
See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 49, at 2-5.
75.
Id. at 2.
76.
Id. at 3. OCC-supervised entities include national banks, federal savings associations, their
subsidiaries, and federal branches and agencies of foreign banking organizations. Fintech firms are not
eligible to enroll in the OCC program on their own. Id.
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of consumers, businesses, and communities,” promoting financial inclusion,
and reducing “significant risks to individual banks or the overall banking
system.”77 At the same time, the OCC’s proposed program does not provide
any waivers from the applicable state or federal laws.78 Fully cognizant of
the practical importance of such waivers, the financial and tech industries
joined forces in actively lobbying the OCC to incorporate an explicit
immunity from liability into its program.79
In principle, the regulatory sandbox strategy is subject to a number of
potential criticisms. One of the fundamental problems with this type of
regulatory experimentation is the inherent difficulty of determining
whether, and to what extent, any particular fintech product is truly novel or
“innovative”—and therefore worthy of inclusion in the regulatory sandbox.
On an instrumental level, evaluating the novelty and social desirability of
fintech products requires financial regulators to develop or acquire
sufficiently extensive and deep technical expertise. The fact that it is often
impossible to separate any particular fintech product’s financial functions
from its technological features makes this task even more challenging for
the regulators.
On a deeper level, moreover, the inquiry into the “novelty” of any
particular fintech product directly implicates the broader normative question
of how we define and assess “financial innovation,” not simply as a matter
of private benefit but also as a matter of public interest.80 Introducing this
type of a macro-level perspective, in turn, significantly complicates the
seemingly technical decision regarding whether or not a particular fintech
product is sufficiently “innovative” to qualify for the sandbox testing. It is
not clear to what extent the regulators running fintech sandbox programs
currently engage in this kind of a normatively thick analysis.
Another potential criticism of fintech sandboxes points to the downside
of broad regulatory discretion with respect to admission of individual firms

77.
Id. at 4.
78.
Id. at 5. The OCC may address the legality of any proposed activity within the context of
the program; however, such legality has to be established before any live test. Id.
79.
See Kate Berry, OCC’s Innovation Pilot Gets Little Love from Banks, AM. BANKER (July
30, 2019, 9:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/occs-innovation-pilot-gets-little-lovefrom-banks [https://perma.cc/488G-T68U].
80.
For a detailed discussion, see Saule T. Omarova, What Kind of Finance Should There Be?,
83 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2020).
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into these experimental programs. The proponents of the more laissez-faire
approach to finance, for instance, claim that regulators’ power to pick and
choose among the firms “distorts the market and weakens the positive
effects brought by competition.”81 These critics accordingly push for greater
decisional transparency and demand that financial regulators “maximize the
number of firms allowed to participate in the sandbox to the greatest extent
possible.”82 Of course, the practical result of such “openness” would be to
relax existing regulatory requirements for everyone, thus effectively
dismantling the existing system of financial regulation.
From a macro-systemic perspective, the key consequences of the
regulatory sandbox strategy are even more difficult to disentangle. On the
one hand, setting up a regulatory sandbox is a potentially effective way to
generate usable empirical data for better regulatory decision-making. This
type of regulatory learning has potentially significant long-term benefits.
On the other hand, however, the efficacy of this effort depends
fundamentally on the specific design features of each individual sandbox
program. Thus, if the specific assessment criteria for fintech products in the
sandbox insufficiently capture potentially problematic effects of these
products on consumer interests or financial stability, the resulting data will
not be a reliable indicator of how that product will fare outside the sandbox.
Even more importantly, the inherently circumscribed nature of sandboxes
may make it impossible for them to serve as an appropriate platform for
testing some of the key macro-level, systemic implications of specific
fintech products. In this sense, this form of regulatory experimentation may
not help to predict or ameliorate the most consequential risks posed by the
so-called “innovative” fintech products and services. Nor would it deepen
the regulators’ understanding of such risks.
III. THE “INCORPORATION” APPROACH: FINTECH CHARTERS
Special licensing or chartering of fintech firms is emerging as another
popular tool of regulatory adjustment to fintech innovation. As a general

81.
Brian Knight, Done Right, Regulatory Sandboxes Can Promote Competition, AM. BANKER
(Aug. 8, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/done-right-regulatory-sandboxescan-promote-competition [https://perma.cc/3JFR-LE4U].
82.
Id.
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matter, this particular regulatory strategy seeks to augment the overall
regulatory perimeter and the jurisdictional authority of individual agencies
by incorporating new market entrants into the existing regulatory regimes.
In the United States, many core financial activities require special
authorization and oversight by one or more financial regulators. For
instance, no entity can legally engage in the “business of banking”83 without
obtaining a bank charter from the OCC or a state bank regulatory agency.84
Securities dealing and brokerage, while not requiring a special charter,
subjects relevant entities to mandatory registration and oversight by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or state securities regulators.85
States, in turn, require businesses offering money-transmitting services to
register and obtain the corresponding “money transmitter” licenses.86
In this context, many fintech firms’ business models raise complicated
questions of the potential applicability of various chartering and licensing
requirements.87 From these firms’ perspectives, the main downside of
obtaining a charter or a license is the higher cost of running a regulated
business. On the plus side, however, having a clearly defined regulatory
status offers significant benefits in terms of legal certainty and potential
federal preemption of multiple state laws.88 Federal preemption, in
particular, explains the popularity of the so-called “rent-a-charter” practice
among marketplace lenders, pursuant to which their bank-partners accept
their clients’ deposits and fund their loans before selling them to the

83.
12 U.S.C. § 24 (2012). For an in-depth analysis of the concept of the “business of banking”
and its interpretation by the OCC, see Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives
Changed the “Business of Banking,” 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041 (2009).
84.
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 21, 24, 22, 26, 27, 1814 (2012).
85.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)-(b) (2012).
86.
See CONF. OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS & MONEY TRANSMITTER REGULATORS ASS’N,
THE STATE OF STATE MONEY SERVICES BUSINESSES REGULATION AND SUPERVISION (2016),
https://www.csbs.org/sites/default/files/201711/State%20of%20State%20MSB%20Regulation%20and%20Supervision%202.pdf
[https://perma.cc/42AG-QAAV]; Marco Santori, What Is Money Transmission and Why Does It
Matter?, COINCENTER.COM (Apr. 7, 2015), https://coincenter.org/entry/what-is-money-transmissionand-why-does-it-matter [https://perma.cc/WC5P-3BKK].
87.
See generally supra Part I.
88.
For an in-depth analysis of the role of federal preemption in the banking sector, see Arthur
E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority and Present A Serious
Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225
(2004).
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marketplace lending platform operator.89 Similar arrangements allow
various fintech payments firms to avoid having to obtain “money
transmitter” licenses from every U.S. state and bear the costs of complying
with each state’s registration, recordkeeping, anti-money laundering, and
other requirements.90
Recognizing the potential appeal of federal preemption to fintech firms,
in late 2016 the OCC proposed a framework for granting a special purpose
national bank charter.91 In 2018, the OCC began accepting applications for
its special purpose fintech charter.92 The OCC stated that it would process
applications in accordance with its existing chartering standards, but
emphasized that it would not require applicants to accept deposits and,
therefore, acquire federal deposit insurance.93 Fintech entities chartered by
the OCC would be exempt from state money-transmitter laws but would be
subject to bank-like prudential requirements, albeit in a modified form
commensurate with their individual risk profiles.94 As the OCC explained,
A fintech company that receives a national bank charter
will be subject to the same high standards of safety and
soundness and fairness that all federally chartered banks

89.
See Fintech: Examining Digitization, Data, and Technology: Hearing before the S. Comm.
On Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. 14-15 (2018) (statement of Saule T. Omarova,
Professor of Law, Cornell Univ.).
90.
See Allen, supra note 58, at 589-90.
91.
See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SUPPORTING RESPONSIBLE
INNOVATION IN THE FEDERAL BANKING SYSTEM: AN OCC PERSPECTIVE, (2016),
https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/pub-responsibleinnovation-banking-system-occ-perspective.pdf [https://perma.cc/TSG7-H8ZC].
For a detailed
discussion of the OCC’s fintech chartering efforts, see David Zaring, Modernizing the Bank Charter, 61
WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
92.
See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S LICENSING
MANUAL SUPPLEMENT: CONSIDERING CHARTER APPLICATIONS FROM FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY
COMPANIES (2018), https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/licensing-manuals/filepub-lm-considering-charter-applications-fintech.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DBL-PHNN]; OCC Begins
Accepting National Bank Charter Applications from Financial Technology Companies, OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY (July 31, 2018), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/newsreleases/2018/nr-occ-2018-74.html [https://perma.cc/VVW7-B2VL].
93.
See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL
TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES’ ELIGIBILITY TO APPLY FOR NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS 3 (2018),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/pub-other-occpolicy-statement-fintech.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SNU-U84B].
94.
Id.
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must meet. As it does for all banks under its supervision,
the OCC would tailor these standards based on the bank’s
size, complexity, and risk profile, consistent with
applicable law. In addition, a fintech company with a
national bank charter will be supervised like similarly
situated national banks, including with respect to capital,
liquidity, and risk management.95
As non-depository institutions, however, OCC-chartered fintech firms
would not be deemed “banks” for purposes of the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956 (BHC Act).96 The BHC Act imposes significant limitations on
the ability of companies controlling or affiliated with federally insured
banks to conduct non-banking activities.97 By imposing these restrictions,
the statute implements the long-standing U.S. principle of separating
banking from commerce.98 The ability to avoid onerous restrictions on nonfinancial activities of chartered fintech firms’ parent-companies is of
particular significance to “Big Tech” firms running large-scale commercial
empires.99
Despite the promise of federal preemption and regulatory certainty, to
date, the practical utility of the OCC charter remains unclear. As of mid2019, no firm has received a special-purpose national bank charter. Google
and PayPal reportedly approached the OCC but ultimately abandoned the
idea.100 To a great extent, this is a product of the perceived harshness of the

95.
Id.
96.
12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1852 (2018). For an analysis of the evolution of the BHC Act and its
definition of “bank,” see Saule T. Omarova & Margaret E. Tahyar, That Which We Call A Bank:
Revisiting the History of Bank Holding Company Regulations in the United States, 31 REV. BANKING
& FIN. L. 113 (2012).
97.
12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1852.
98.
For more on the principle of separation of banking from commerce, see Saule T. Omarova,
The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265 (2013).
99.
See Lalita Clozel, Why Are Amazon, PayPal Meeting with Bank Regulators? AM. BANKER
(Sept. 29, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/why-are-amazon-paypal-meetingwith-bank-regulators [https://perma.cc/6X2D-D4US].
100.
See Rachel Witkowski, Google and PayPal Explored OCC’s Fintech Charter, Then Walked
Away, AM. BANKER (June 26, 2019, 9:50 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/google-andpaypal-explored-occs-fintech-charter-then-walked-away [https://perma.cc/M9V3-4YKD].
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regulatory and supervisory requirements applicable to chartered entities.101
In addition, potential applicants may be discouraged by the lack of legal
certainty regarding the OCC’s authority to issue this type of a specialpurpose charter, which is currently the subject of a court challenge by state
banking regulators.102
From the states’ perspective, a federal fintech charter presents a
competitive threat, especially since several states already offer specialized
licenses for cryptocurrency exchanges and other fintech firms offering
cryptocurrency services.103 Thus, the New York Department of Financial
Services (NYDFS) has been offering its BitLicense since 2015.104 As of
mid-2019, companies like Ripple, Coinbase, and Square hold New York’s
BitLicense.105 The BitLicense regime focuses mainly on anti-money
laundering, cybersecurity, and customer protection safeguards. Any firm
that operates a virtual currency exchange, issues, transmits, buys and sells,

101.
See, e.g., Beyond FinTech: The OCC’s Special Purpose National Bank Charter, DAVIS
POLK
(Dec.
9,
2016)
https://www.davispolk.cco/files/2016-129_occs_special_purpose_national_bank_charter.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9LD-ZTT8] (“For many
business models or early stage companies, the regulatory and supervisory burdens of the special purpose
charter may outweigh its benefits.”).
102.
For a recent complaint filed by the Conference of State Banking Supervisors, see Complaint,
Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, No. 1:18-cv-02449
(D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2018). See also Statement by Acting Financial Services Superintendent Linda A.
Lacewell Regarding the Court’s Decision to Allow DFS’s Lawsuit Against the OCC to Move Forward,
DEP’T
FIN.
SERVS.
(May
2,
2019),
N.Y.
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/reports_and_publications/statements_comments/2019/st1905021[https://perma
.cc/WS66-DVRC]. See generally John W. Ryan, CSBS Responds to Treasury, OCC Fintech
Announcements, CONF. OF ST. BANKING SUPERVISORS (July 31, 2018), https://www.csbs.org/csbsresponds-treasury-occ-fintech-announcements [https://perma.cc/9UA8-EFAF]. In October 2019, the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that the OCC had no legal authority to
issue its proposed fintech charter, a decision the agency is planning to appeal. See Lacewell v. Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, No. 18-civ-8377 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2019); Kate Rooney, Fintech’s
Fast Pass to Traditional Banking Is Now Cut Off, CNBC.COM (Oct. 24, 2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/24/fintechs-fast-pass-to-traditional-banking-is-now-cut-off.html
[https://perma.cc/8EVS-L75B].
103.
For an overview of state regulation of crypto-assets in the United States, see Matthew E.
Kohen & Justin S. Wales, State Regulations on Virtual Currency and Blockchain Technologies,
CARLTON FIELDS (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.carltonfields.com/insights/publications/2018/stateregulations-on-virtual-currency-and-blockchain-technologies [https://perma.cc/KVZ5-DN9R].
104.
Id.
105.
Jessica Klein, New York Just Granted its 18th BitLicense, BREAKERMAG (Mar. 28, 2019),
https://breakermag.com/new-york-grants-its-13th-bitlicense-since-last-may/ [https://perma.cc/KQ34NVTZ].
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stores, or otherwise provides services related to any virtual currency is
required to obtain BitLicense.106
While New York’s BitLicense regime has been criticized for its
ostensibly harsh requirements, Wyoming has emerged as “one of the most
crypto-friendly jurisdictions in the United States.”107 By mid-2019,
Wyoming has enacted thirteen laws making it much easier for
cryptocurrency service providers to conduct their business.108 For example,
in March 2018, Wyoming passed a law exempting so-called “utility tokens”
from the state’s securities laws where, among other things, the token is
being sold for consumptive, as opposed to financial investment, purposes.109
In addition, Wyoming legislators amended the state’s money transmitter
laws to provide specific exemptions for virtual currency, exempted virtual
currencies from state property taxes, permitted corporations to keep records
on blockchain, authorized security interests in digital assets, established
standards and procedures for custodial services in crypto-assets, and so
forth.110
Despite these and other instances of state-level regulatory
experimentation, it is important to keep in mind that state licenses and
charters have an inherently limited jurisdictional reach. Since individual
states can only capture activities affecting their own residents, any particular
state regulatory scheme offers limited benefits to fintech firms seeking
national, or even global, presence.111 Furthermore, these jurisdictional
restrictions make it more difficult even for the most enlightened and agile

106.
See BitLicense Frequently Asked Questions, N.Y. DEP’T FIN. SERVS.,
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/apps_and_licensing/virtual_currency_businesses/bitlicense_faqs
[https://perma.cc/NAZ9-UKTM] (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
107.
Kohen & Wales, supra note 103.
108.
See Gregory Barber, The Newest Haven for Cryptocurrency Companies? Wyoming, WIRED
(June 13, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/newest-haven-cryptocurrency-companieswyoming/ [https://perma.cc/HKF5-3EPG]; Caitlin Long, What Do Wyoming’s 13 New Blockchain Laws
Mean?, FORBES (Mar. 4, 2019, 7:29 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/caitlinlong/2019/03/04/whatdo-wyomings-new-blockchain-laws-mean/#13543fc75fde [https://perma.cc/8FWL-52S2].
109.
Kohen & Wales, supra note 103.
110.
Id.
111.
To overcome this limitation, a growing consortium of states has formed a multistate platform
for money-services businesses, which can operate across the participating states under a license issued
by any single state in the consortium. As of mid-2019, there were twenty-one states in the consortium.
See Rachel Witkowski, Fintechs May Finally Win Charter Chase in 2019, AM. BANKER (Jan. 9, 2019),
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/fintechs-may-finally-win-charter-chase-in-2019
[https://perma.cc/85GQ-7T2D].
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state regulators to identify and correct broader systemic dysfunctions in the
fintech sector. Tech-driven financial markets’ unprecedented ability to
transcend and defy territorial boundaries heightens the importance of
expanding the regulators’ field of vision well beyond the confines of
individual states’ jurisdiction.
Of course, it is still too early for definitive assessments of the practical
impact of new fintech charters and licenses. A few general observations,
however, may be in order. In principle, chartering is a strategy of
accommodating and absorbing new entities and activities into the existing
structure of financial sector oversight. By definition, chartering is an entityby-entity approach that extends the existing regulators’ authority to fintech
firms—and thereby legitimates new fintech-driven business models under
the existing regulatory criteria.
The emphasis on existing regulatory criteria, however, is critical here.
The rigidly compartmentalized U.S. regulatory structure has little internal
flexibility with respect to core substantive requirements built into new
charter types. Thus, a “special purpose” bank charter is bound to contain
certain essential elements of a traditional bank charter, much like a “special”
state-issued cryptocurrency license is often framed as an enhanced form of
a money-transmitter license.112 On the one hand, enhancing or modifying
various long-standing regulatory forms is a well-tested method of
incremental change. On the other hand, preserving regulatory continuity is
not always the most effective response to changing market conditions. If the
principles underlying the original charter requirements do not directly
reflect the new systemic concerns raised by fintech firms’ activities, issuing
“special” fintech charters is not likely to generate significant public benefits.
The fintech industry’s criticism of the OCC’s charter conditions as
excessively onerous illustrates this last point.113 It also suggests that, as a
practical matter, a “successful” fintech chartering strategy—or a strategy
that would attract a large number of applicants—may require significant
loosening of the applicable regulatory and supervisory conditions. Given

112.
It is worth noting, however, that Wyoming’s ambitious and more comprehensive legislative
effort may be an exception to this more narrowly targeted approach. See supra notes 108-110 and
accompanying text.
113.
See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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potentially important systemic implications of adopting more lax chartering
standards, however, this may lead to socially undesirable outcomes.
IV. THE “ACCOMMODATION” APPROACH:
REGTECH AND OTHER METHODS
The third category of emerging approaches to fintech regulation
encompasses a wide range of regulatory efforts to accommodate and adjust
to tech-driven market developments. RegTech, in particular, is quickly
becoming a fashionable term of art in the fintech discourse.114 This term
denotes a trend toward “the automation and streamlining of regulatory
processes,” including data collection and compliance monitoring.115
Perhaps the most visible example of RegTech involves a large-scale
replacement of the current regulatory data collection and reporting systems
with fully automated and digitized technologies, including AI and cloudbased data management.116 To the extent that manual data collection and
processing tends to be both time-consuming and costly, this technological
“leveraging” is expected to generate significant savings both for financial
regulators and for regulated firms.117 In addition to lowering the economic
burden associated with regulatory reporting, RegTech promises to improve
the quality of regulatory data by, among other things, reducing inaccuracies
and duplications in data collection process. These expected efficiencies
acquire particular significance in light of the substantial increase in the
scope and granularity of mandatory disclosure and reporting requirements
since the 2008 crisis.118

114.
For a small sample of the growing literature of RegTech, see Douglas W. Arner, Jànos
Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, FinTech, RegTech, and Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, 37
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 371, 376 (2017); Lawrence G. Baxter, Adaptive Financial Regulation and
RegTech: A Concept Article on Realistic Protection for Victims of Bank Failures, 66 DUKE L. J. 567
(2016); Tom Butler, Towards a Standards-Based Technology Architecture for RegTech, 45 J. FIN.
TRANSFORMATION 49 (2017); Luca Enriques, Financial Supervisors and RegTech: Four Roles and Four
Challenges, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT FINANCIER 53 (2017).
115.
Arner, et al., supra note 114, at 376. It is worth noting that, as used in this article, the term
“RegTech” refers to the government’s use of new technologies for regulatory and supervisory purposes,
and not to the advances in private firms’ use of technology for purposes of regulatory compliance.
116.
See Joel Clark, Capitalising on Regtech, RISK.NET (July 30, 2018),
https://www.risk.net/regulation/5819321/capitalising-on-regtech [https://perma.cc/W3P2-GAWA].
117.
Id.
118.
Id.; Arner et al., supra note 114, at 384.
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Another important feature of RegTech is that it potentially enables
financial regulators to synchronize their data collection and supervisory
monitoring with individual firms’ internal data management. This can be
done, for example, by digitizing and making regulations machine-readable
and by using software interoperable with firms’ internal compliance
software.119 Interestingly, this idea brings into sharp relief the broader
potential significance of RegTech as a paradigmatic shift toward a new
regime of “real-time and proportionate” financial regulation and
supervision.120 In effect, it may be said that the emerging RegTech discourse
is quietly recasting the broader concept of “smart” regulation in narrowly
techno-centric terms.121
In this sense, RegTech offers more than simply a new set of tools for
increasing regulatory capacity—it potentially offers an alternative
regulatory philosophy. It is, therefore, critical to exercise caution in
assessing the full costs and benefits of RegTech. To date, typical concerns
in connection with the spread of RegTech have focused primarily on the
heightened vulnerability of agencies’ information processing systems to
cyberattacks, the government’s usual lack of resources and technical
expertise, and similar issues.122 From a systemic perspective, however, the
risks posed by a wholesale shift to RegTech go far beyond these and similar
operational or personnel-related issues. On the one hand, digitizing and
automating a critical mass of regulatory and supervisory functions can make
them much faster and cheaper to perform. On the other hand, these same
choices may irreversibly undermine regulators’ overall ability to exercise
meaningful oversight of the financial system.
For example, the existing system of bank supervision operates through an
informed and context-specific assessment by bank examiners of individual
entities’ compliance not only with specific laws and regulations, but also
with public policy goals and norms underlying them.123 Importantly, this
process involves a continuous analysis of, and engagement with, both

119.
See Clark, supra note 117; Enriques, supra note 114.
120.
Arner et al., supra note 114, at 376, 382.
121.
See supra Part II.
122.
See Enriques, supra note 114.
123.
For more on the history and principles of bank supervision, see Lev Menand, Too Big to
Supervise: The Rise of Financial Conglomerates and the Decline of Discretionary Oversight in Banking,
103 CORNELL L. REV. 1527 (2018).
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quantitative and qualitative factors.124 Replacing this kind of holistic,
accretive, and normatively informed judgment with an algorithmic
“matching” of standardized micro-level data with specific machinereadable rules may have an ironic effect of drastically decreasing both the
contextual “proportionality” and practical efficacy of financial regulation
and supervision.125
More broadly, this approach is likely to solidify private market actors’
control over both technology and finance. This asymmetric shift in the
public-private balance in finance will have potentially crucial systemic
implications, precisely because it will not diminish the sovereign public’s
responsibility for providing systemic stability.126 To the contrary,
accommodating fintech-driven financial market developments may very
well increase the government’s market-backstopping burden.
In fact, financial regulators around the world are already working on
various ways to accommodate tech-driven market developments, both
through existing and brand-new forms of legal and infrastructural support
of fintech activities. This includes, for example, the creation of national
digital identity systems that, among other things, would significantly aid
fintech firms’ compliance with anti-money laundering rules.127 Another
important dimension of the ongoing official efforts to accommodate fintech
involves establishing uniform standards for various aspects of online
transactions, clarifying ambiguities via regulatory guidance on specific
matters, and eliminating anachronistic overlaps in the existing legislation.
This is a particularly salient issue in the United States, with its patchwork
of federal and state regulations potentially affecting fintech activities.128

124.
See, e.g., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BANK SUPERVISION: REGULATORS IMPROVED
SUPERVISION OF MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES BUT ADDITIONAL STEPS NEEDED (2019) (providing a
detailed analysis of supervisory oversight of banks’ corporate governance and internal management
processes).
125.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
126.
See supra Part I.
127.
See, e.g., Digital Identity Trends – 5 Forces that are Shaping 2020, GEMALTO (June 25,
2019), https://www.gemalto.com/govt/identity/digital-identity-services/trends [https://perma.cc/Y2T5U3TG].
128.
This “regulatory modernization” line of argument, however, can also be used to justify
politically motivated massive deregulation in the financial services sector. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, supra note 68. For a critique of these deregulatory efforts, see Fintech: Examining
Digitization, Data, and technology: Hearing before the S. Comm. On Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, supra note 89.
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Even more prominently, this diffuse strategy of regulatory
accommodation includes things like facilitating industry-wide adoption of
cloud technology and granting fintech firms direct access to central bankrun payment systems.129 Thus, the Bank of England has already opened
direct access to its Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) payment system to
non-bank payment service providers.130 The European Union’s revised
Payment Services Directive, known as PSD 2, also allows nonbank firms to
connect to bank payments and data systems, subject to specific licensing
requirements.131
Granting fintech companies access to central banks’ payments and
clearing systems is typically justified in terms of greater competition,
financial inclusion, and “keeping pace” with the changing market
structure.132 However, Facebook’s recent announcement of an ambitious
plan to issue its own cryptocurrency, called Libra, brought into sharp relief
the broader macroeconomic and political implications of opening central
banks’ balance sheets to Big Tech and other emerging fintech platform
operators.133 The entry of Big Tech companies into financial services
reveals the crucial link between the sheer market power these companies

129.
See HAL S. SCOTT, JOHN GULLIVER & HILLEL NADLER, CLOUD COMPUTING IN THE
FINANCIAL SECTOR: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 6 (2019), https://www.pifsinternational.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/07/Cloud-Computing-in-the-Financial-Sector_Global-Perspective-Final_July2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/W75F-53ZX].
130.
See Bank of England Extends Direct Access to RTGS Accounts to Non-Bank Payment
OF
ENG.
(July
19,
2017),
Service
Providers,
BANK
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/2017/july/boe-extends-direct-access-to-rtgs-accounts-to-nonbank-payment-service-providers [https://perma.cc/JC8A-TMYS]; BANK OF ENG., A BLUEPRINT FOR A
NEW RTGS SERVICE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM (2017), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk//media/boe/files/payments/a-blueprint-for-a-new-rtgs-service-for-theuk.pdf?la=en&hash=56424C6BC6D9E056F05476A96B482D4779377E45 [https://perma.cc/M9AALZ53].
131.
See 2015 O.J. (L 2015/2366) 337. This particular form of regulatory accommodation works
in tandem with the chartering strategy.
132.
Id.
133.
See
LIBRA,
LIBRA
WHITE
PAPER,
https://libra.org/en-US/white-paper/
[https://perma.cc/C8DW-CJA9]. For an analysis of potential macro-systemic implications of the Libra
proposal, see Saule Omarova and Graham Steele, There’s a Lot We Still Don’t Know About Libra, N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
4,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/opinion/facebook-libracryptocurrency.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/9AP8-N3AM].
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yield in purely commercial markets and their potential to emerge as a new
breed of “too big to fail” financial institution.134
Facebook’s plan to launch Libra as the world’s leading currency, built on
top of the world’s most ubiquitous social media platform, illustrates these
structural dynamics.135 It also shows how fintech is tying financial markets
to non-financial sectors of the economy in an increasingly visible and
politically salient manner.136 Perhaps even more importantly, the Facebook
controversy puts a concrete, intuitively understandable spin on issues long
relegated to technocratic decision-making. In this broader sense, it may help
to create a real policy opening for more comprehensive and normatively
grounded structural responses to the fintech challenge than the ones we are
seeing today.137
CONCLUSION
This symposium article examines the emerging approaches to regulating
fintech as a distinct market phenomenon. Using the United States as its main
case study, the article argues that the principal forms of regulatory response
to fintech to date continue to operate in the traditionally technocratic vein.
Despite the wide variety of specific policy choices and legislative
developments around the world, the overall process appears to rely
primarily on the existing regulatory tools and techniques as the means of
accommodating and absorbing new entities and activities into the
established regulatory schemes.
Regulatory sandboxes, special fintech charters, and RegTech exemplify
this general pattern. A focused analysis of these strategies reveals both the
inherent complexity of fintech as an object of financial regulation and the
utmost importance of the regulators’ capacity—and willingness—to rise to
its challenges. As the article shows, current regulatory approaches seek

134.
See Fintech: Examining Digitization, Data, and Technology: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, supra note 89, at 14.
135.
See Omarova & Steele, supra note 133.
136.
Id.; Graham Steele, Facebook’s Libra Cryptocurrency is Part of a Disturbing Financial
POST
(Aug.
12,
2019,
7:23
AM),
Trend,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/08/12/facebooks-libra-cryptocurrency-is-partdisturbing-financial-trend/ [https://perma.cc/U6DN-GENX].
137.
For a detailed discussion of potential approaches to developing such a comprehensive,
systemically-oriented strategy of fintech regulation, see Omarova, supra note 8.
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primarily to facilitate private innovation, among other things, by providing
infrastructural support for tech-driven market developments and by making
financial regulation more tech-friendly and technology-specific. This
normative framing both reflects and reinforces financial regulators’
traditional preference for technical solutions narrowly targeting micro-level
transactional problems—and their antipathy toward macro-level structural
measures involving more explicit political trade-offs. This regulatory
mindset, however, is inherently limited in its ability to recognize and
address the deeper systemic implications of fintech as a potential disruption
of the fundamental public-private balance of power in modern finance.138
Of course, at this relatively early stage in the process, it is difficult to
render a definitive assessment with respect to the practical efficacy of any
specific regulatory development in the fintech space. Nevertheless, the
conceptual exercise of identifying and unpacking the core features and
drivers of the regulatory responses to fintech disruption, as they appear
today, establishes a helpful baseline for further discussion and policy
analysis. Examining these response strategies as interconnected parts of an
emerging regulatory pattern enriches our collective understanding of their
relative strengths and shortcomings. In a broader sense, moreover, it
underscores the importance of developing a normatively unified and
coherent strategy of fintech regulation, which would seek—explicitly and
systematically—to support and harness the power of technology in the
public’s interest.
We are not there yet.

138.
See supra notes19-28 and accompanying text. For an in-depth analysis of the disconnect
between the predominantly technocratic philosophy of today’s financial regulation and the fundamental
regulatory challenges posed by fintech, see Omarova, supra note 8.
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